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Abstract: 
The 2008 global financial crisis spread to most of the developed economies, including those of 
the European Union. Unfortunately, despite decades of effort to build a Single Financial Market, 
almost all EU jurisdictions lacked proper crisis resolution mechanisms, especially with respect to 
the cross-border dimensions of a global crisis. This led to a threat of widespread bank failures in 
EU countries and near collapse of their financial systems. Today, in the context of the Eurozone 
financial crisis, the EU is at a critical crossroads. It has to decide whether the road to recovery 
runs through closer integration of financial policies and of bank supervision and resolution, or 
whether to take the path of fragmentation with a gradual return to controlled forms of 
protectionism in the pursuit of narrow national interest, although the latter is bound to endanger 
the single market. Therefore, the policy dilemmas facing the EU and contemporary institution 
building within the Eurozone provide an important window into the future of both global and 
regional financial integration. 
 
The paper is in five parts. Following the present introduction, Part II provides an analytical 
overview of economic and institutional developments relating to the EU single market for 
financial services in the pre-crisis period. Part III discusses the evolution of the EU Single 
Financial Market and the causes of the Eurozone crisis. Part IV reviews the main tenets of the 
European Banking Union and considers how this new set of EU institutions will affect EU 
economic and political integration. Part V concludes with discussion of potential implications of 
EU experiences for the future of financial integration. 
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I. Introduction  
The 2008 global financial crisis spread to most of the developed economies, including those of 
the European Union. Unfortunately, despite decades of effort to build a Single Financial Market, 
almost all EU jurisdictions lacked proper crisis resolution mechanisms, especially with respect to 
the cross-border dimensions of a global crisis.1 This led to a threat of widespread bank failures in 
EU countries and near collapse of their financial systems. Today, in the context of the Eurozone 
financial crisis, the EU is at a critical crossroads. It has to decide whether the road to recovery 
runs through closer integration of financial policies and of bank supervision and resolution, or 
whether to take the path of fragmentation with a gradual return to controlled forms of 
protectionism in the pursuit of narrow national interest, although the latter is bound to endanger 
the single market. Therefore, the policy dilemmas facing the EU and contemporary institution 
building within the Eurozone provide an important window into the future of both global and 
regional financial integration.  
The complexity of the financial integration process and its significance means that it is 
impossible to understand contemporary developments within the Eurozone without a discussion 
of the different forms of integration and of the history of financial integration in Europe. It is 
important to draw a distinction between economic, monetary and political forms of integration 
before looking at the specific properties of EU financial integration. Economic integration 
normally refers to integration of national commercial and economic policies and elimination of 
trade barriers and of obstacles to foreign direct investment (FDI).2 Monetary integration3 refers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See E. Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets: The Law, the Economics, the Politics (CUP, 2012), 
ch. 6. See also Recine, F., & Teixeira, P. G. (November 2009). The New Financial Stability Architecture in the EU 
(November 2009). Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2009-62. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1509304 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1509304. 
2 For Ropke, the free and reciprocal flow of trade between national economies is what defines economic integration. 
See, Ropke, W. (1959). International Order and Economic Integration. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company. Wilhelm Röpke was a proponent of the Austrian School, thus he was suspicious of other forms of 
integration, such as political integration and attendant consolidation of political power. He was one of the first 
economists to highlight the connection between culture and economic systems and uncharacteristically for a member 
of the ‘Austrian’ school he explored the ethical foundations of a market-based social order. His ideas had significant 
influence over West German post-war economic development. 
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to formal currency alignments and interest rate cooperation between states. On the other hand, 
financial sector integration refers to the elimination of restrictions to cross-border capital flows 
that may involve transactions concerning loans, debt and equity securities, and of barriers to 
cross-border market access by financial intermediaries, as well as to rights of foreign firm 
establishment. The market for a given set of financial instruments and/or services is fully 
integrated if all potential market participants with the same relevant characteristics deal with a 
single set of rules, when they decide to transact in financial instruments and / or provide financial 
services, and firms and consumers have non-discriminatory access to such financial instruments 
and / or services. It must also provide non-discriminatory regulatory oversight arrangements.4 
Finally, political integration is equally important. It involves the voluntary sharing/pooling of 
sovereignty, whether in commercial and financial affairs, trade-policy cooperation/co-ordination, 
or in relation to justice and national security.5 Thus, lack of political integration can hinder the 
flow of benefits emanating from monetary and financial integration. 
A central idea of this paper is that the design of institutions underpinning financial 
integration has to be a step-by-step process, as in the EU over several decades, starting with the 
European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community (EEC)6 and from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Monetary arrangements that supplement trade relationships have existed for centuries. In the Eastern 
Roman Empire, for example, the solidus coin —a currency whose metallic content was stable—circulated 
widely for more than seven hundred years. Its predecessor the denarius was undermined by emperor 
Diocletian’s (284-305AD) debasing of the metal content of the coin to cover the penury of the Roman 
treasury at the time due to continuous defensive wars. This type of monetary arrangement was not a true 
monetary union but rather a common-currency-standard area, because each country’s monetary policy 
was separately rooted in a commodity—such as gold or silver—and they did not involve establishment of 
a common monetary authority or currency. Thus, they can hardly compare with the EMU. See, Meade, E. 
E. (March 21, 2009). Monetary Integration. Rethinking Finance: Harvard International Review. 
http://hir.harvard.edu/rethinking-finance/monetary-integration 
4 See, Baele, L., Ferrando, A., Hördahl, P., Krylova, E., & Monnet, C. (April 2004). Measuring Financial 
Integration in the Euro Area. Occasional Paper Series No. 14: European Central Bank. P.7 
5 On the main tenets of political integration in an intergovernmentalist rational bargaining framework see 
A. Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 34 (1993), 473-524. 
6 The EU traces its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European 
Economic Community (EEC). The ECSC was established in 1951; it was a six-nation international 
organization serving to abolish trade barriers in the areas covered by the Treaty between the democratic 
nations of Western Europe, as the Cold War had divided the geographic area covered by European 
nations through the so-called ‘iron curtain’. The ECSC was the first purely European organization in the 
postwar era to be based on the principles of supra-nationalism.  
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there to the EU and ultimately to the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the 
introduction of the single currency.7 It is submitted that problems inevitably arise when a supra-
national market exhibits a high degree of integration but the development of cross-border 
regulatory mechanisms lags significantly behind. This shortcoming has become acutely evident 
in the course of the current Eurozone crisis.  
The paper is in five parts. Following the present introduction, Part II provides an 
analytical overview of economic and institutional developments relating to the EU single market 
for financial services in the pre-crisis period. Part III discusses the evolution of the EU Single 
Financial Market and the causes of the Eurozone crisis. Part IV reviews the main tenets of the 
European Banking Union and considers how this new set of EU institutions will affect EU 
economic and political integration. Part V concludes with discussion of potential implications of 
EU experiences for the future of financial integration.  
 
II.  Building Blocs of the EU Single Financial Market  
The European experience constitutes the most advanced global laboratory for regional economic, 
legal, and political integration.8 Thus, it is worth examining the process of regional financial 
integration, as it developed in Europe, in order to discern inherent and artificial obstacles to 
efficient financial governance regimes for an integrated market. The establishment of pan-
European banks has, of course, been the most potent integrative factor, in an environment 
marked, at least at the earlier stages, by absence of regulatory cohesion. At the same time, it was 
inevitable that the concurrent presence of pan-European banks and of incoherent regulatory 
structures would lead to financial instability across the single market and especially across the 
single currency area, in the event of serious market turbulence.  
A.  Challenges of European Financial Integration  
The establishment of a single currency area (the Eurozone) and the pan-European presence of a 
number of large banks with large cross-border operations lent urgency to questions about long-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Maastricht Treaty established the European Union (EU) in 1993. The same Treaty introduced the 
charter of the European Monetary Union. The EU Treaty has undergone a series of amendments as its 
ambit and reach, both in terms of new members in terms of powers, became ever broader. The latest 
amendment of the EU treaty is the Treaty of Lisbon, 2009. 
8 Wouters, J., & Ramopoulos, T. (2012). The G20 and Global Economic Governance: Lessons from 
Multilevel European Governance? Journal of International Economic Law.  
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term protection of EU-wide financial stability in the absence of appropriate institutional 
arrangements.9 The so-called financial stability trilemma,10 which states that the (three) 
objectives of financial stability, financial integration, and national financial policies cannot be 
combined at the same time, has precisely described the acute policy tradeoff which holds that 
one of these objectives has to give in to safeguard the other two.11 In spite assertions to the 
contrary,12 the recent crisis has proven beyond doubt that a common currency area is not viable 
without building, at the same time, transnational supervisory structures in the field of fiscal 
monitoring and responsibility and bank supervision. 
Arguably, an essential pre-requisite of financial market integration is importation of a 
harmonized set of core rules, which border on uniformity13 and are binding in all jurisdictions 
comprising the single market. Absence of such uniformity can, in theory, seriously hinder market 
integration as it can give rise to regulatory arbitrage and hidden protectionism and harm efficient 
group approaches to capital allocation and risk management within cross-border banks.14 There 
is no area where divergence of national rules and regulations is more important than cross-border 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In 2005 Schoenmaker and Oosterloow conducted a statistical study spanning a four-year period (2000-
03) on the potential emergence of pan-European banking groups. To this effect they gathered a new data 
set on cross-border penetration (as a proxy for cross-border externalities) of 30 large EU banking groups. 
They found a home country bias, but the data indicated that the number of groups having potential to pose 
significant cross-border externalities within the EU context was not only substantial but also increasing. 
Policymakers therefore had to face the challenge of designing European structures for financial 
supervision and stability to deal effectively with these emerging European banking groups. See for 
details, Schoenmaker, D., & Oosterloow, S. (2005). Financial Supervision in an Integrating Europe: 
Measuring Cross-Border Externalities. International Finance, 8(1), 1–27. 
10 See, Schoenmaker, D. (February, 2011). The Financial Trilemma. Duisenberg School of Finance 
Amsterdam & Finance Department VU University Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; 
Forthcoming in Economics Letters, 7. See also, Thygesen, N. (2003). Comments on The Political 
Economy of Financial Harmonisation in Europe. In J. Kremer, D. Schoenmaker & P. Wierts (Eds.), 
Financial Supervision in Europe: Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
11 C.f. Lastra and Louis who (perhaps more accurately) describe the same trade off as an ‘inconsistent 
quartet’ of policy objectives: free trade, full capital mobility, pegged (or fixed) exchange rates and 
independent national monetary policies (Lastra, R. M., & Louis, J.-V. (2013). European Economic and 
Monetary Union: History, Trends, and Prospects. Yearbook of European Law.  
12 See Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, The Road to Monetary Union in Europe: The Emperor, the Kings and 
the Genies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
13 Uniformity in this context only means the need to have coherence and compatible rules and regulations 
across jurisdictions. 
14 Larosiere, J. d. (February 2009). Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU. 
Brussels: European Union. 
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bank failures. Thus, protection of financial stability in an integrated financial market 
characterized by cross-border financial institutions becomes a very challenging task, especially 
when there are incongruent policy measures between national preferences and regional 
integration requirements. While, at the later stages of single market development the EU has 
moved very close to maximum harmonization in the field financial market regulation, the overall 
European regulatory edifice lacked strong uniformity/consistency both in terms of rule 
construction and rule enforcement in this area. In addition, there has been a marked absence of 
institutions that could provide binding guidance, in the event of difference of opinion between 
national regulators, as regards the application and enforcement of financial regulation, or could 
resolve eventual conflicts of national regulatory actions.  
  
B.  Early Stages of European Financial Integration 
Financial integration in Europe is a much earlier than late 20th century phenomenon, at least for 
the leading European markets. There is convincing evidence, which shows that by the mid-
eighteenth century European equity markets were well integrated.15 This was, in general, a 
period characterized by a transition from autarky to integrated world capital markets, and, thus, 
for many it constitutes the era of the first globalization. The term ‘financial integration’ however, 
was not used in this sense before the mid-1950s. German neoliberals during the 1950s advocated 
international integration through removal of trade barriers and the introduction of free 
convertibility. Machlup associated financial integration with capital mobility.16 Ropke stated that 
multilateral trade and free convertibility was only ‘a different expression’ for international 
integration just as bilateralism and capital controls are another name for international 
disintegration of the economy. As this argument goes, the greater the degree of regional 
integration by multilateralism and convertibility, the larger are the advantages of economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Neal, L. (1985). Integration of international capital markets: quantitative evidence from the eighteenth 
to twentieth centuries. Journal of Economic History, 45, 219-226. Also, Neal, L. (1990). The rise of 
financial capitalism: international capital markets in the age of reason. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. Neal, L. (1992). The disintegration and re-integration of international capital markets in 
the 19th century. Business and Economic History, 2, 84-96. 
16 See, Machlup, F. (1977). A History of Thought on Economic Integration. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
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cooperation.17 Yet evidence of the existence of a direct causal relationship between financial 
integration and economic growth remains inconclusive,18 as any economic growth benefits 
deriving from financial integration depend upon a number of preconditions necessary to facilitate 
the integration process.19  
When the six-state European Economic Community (EEC) was established, in 1957 (by 
the Treaty of Rome), furthering member states’ growth was the apparent but not sole objective of 
the founders. Political integration was a stronger long-term objective. Namely, building a single 
market was seen as an essential pre-requisite to political integration and not a self-standing goal. 
The fact that political integration in the EU is still nowhere close to what was envisaged by the 
founding fathers can easily explain the lack of adequate institutions supervising the single 
financial market and securing financial stability. For example, even one of the EU fundamental 
freedoms, the free movement of capital, became effective only after the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, a full 35 years after the Treaty of Rome, as it was essential in building a 
European monetary union and national restrictions in the free flow of capital could no longer be 
retained. 
 
C.  The Role of the EU Treaties in European Integration: An Ever Closer Union?  
The European economic integration process and the establishment of the Euro as the common 
currency of (as of today) seventeen EU member states has been incremental with periods of 
strong progress and of painfully slow growth. In general, it has been the product of political 
expediencies as much as of economic efficiency rationales and it has witnessed major crises and 
setbacks.20  
 Western European economies have shown in the post-war era a marked preference for 
exchange rate stability. When the first set of European arrangements aiming at exchange rate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ropke, W. (1950). The social crisis of our time. London: Hodge. See also, Dorn, J. A., & Xi, W. (Eds.). 
(1990). Economic reform in China: problems and prospects. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. P.120 
18 Liu, Q., Lejot, P., & Arner, D. A. (2013). Forthcoming (ch 12, page.513) 
19 Such integration pre-requisites include domestic institutional reforms, the maintenance of adequate and 
enforceable property rights, and adequate controls on money supply. See also, Dorn, J. A., & Xi, W. 
(Eds.). (1990). Economic reform in China: problems and prospects. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. P.121 
20 See P Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,” Comparative 
Political Studies, 29 (1996), 123-63 and J. Story and I. Walter, Political Economy of Financial 
Integration in Europe: The Battle of the Systems (Manchester University Press, 1997). 
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stability failed, following the collapse of the requisite Bretton Woods arrangements, and the 
post-war world entered the era of floating exchange rates, EEC members created the European 
Monetary System (EMS) in 1979,21 in order to manage and control currency fluctuations among 
EMS members. EMS was viewed as the first step towards permanent exchange rate alignment 
and paved the way towards the establishment of EMU. Eventually, EMU member states 
irrevocably pegged the exchange rates of member country currencies, which were replaced by 
single European currency. 
At this point it should be noted that the establishment of the single currency was itself a 
matter of politics as much as of economic necessity. Of course, through a currency union, EU 
members could answer the classic monetary trilemma, which is built on the Mundell-Fleming 
model of an open economy under capital mobility.22 The monetary trilemma famously states that 
a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility, and national monetary policy cannot be achieved at the 
same time; one policy objective has to give. Therefore, under capital mobility and national 
monetary policy, fixed exchange rates will invariably break down.23 However, as the EU has 
been very far from being an optimal currency area under the Mundell model,24 and there was no 
fiscal integration or debt mutualization it was only a matter of time before the first strains would 
appear. It is, thus, arguable that the founders of the EMU just hoped that a single currency would 
pave the way for a fiscal and political union, something that has not yet happened. Moreover the 
desire for a political union might not have been the whole story. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See, Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 1978 on the establishment of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) and related matters (1978) Bulletin of the European Communities. December, 
No 12, pp 9–13. Regulations Nos 380 and 381/78, 18 December 1978,OJEC, No L379, 30 December 
1978 (and their modifications); Agreement of 13 March 1979 between the central banks of the Member 
States of the European Economic Community laid down the operating procedures for the European 
Monetary System. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation/compendia/a791231en1771979compen
diumcm_a.pdf  See for analysis, Giavazzi, F., & Giovannini, A. (1989). See also, Marcello De Cecco, A. 
G. (Ed.). (1989). 
22 See, Mundell, R. A. (1963). Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible 
Exchange Rates. Canadian Journal of Economics, 29, 475-485 available at 
http://jrxy.zjgsu.edu.cn/jrxy/jssc/2904.pdf  
23 See, Obstfeld, M., Shambaugh, J. C., & Taylor, A. M. (2005). The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs 
among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility. Review of Economics and Statistics, 87, 
423-438. 
24 Mundell, R. A. (1961). A Theory of  Optimum Currency Areas. American Economic Review 51 (4): 
657–665 
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From a political economy viewpoint European financial and monetary integration was 
not just an inter-governmental goal, or merely dictated by the conditions of increasing market 
integration and capital mobility in the EU. The interests of professional intermediaries may have 
also been a strong force behind the push for further integration. For example, the Eurobond and 
the Eurocurrency interbank markets were the markets that emerged as a result of national, legal 
and regulatory impediments to capital flows.25 Given an excess supply of petro-dollars in 
offshore markets, their scale began to rival national markets in banking and securities. This led to 
protracted negotiations in the early 1990s between industry representatives and regulators that 
brought off-shore activity back into national markets, while subsuming the many disparate local 
practices. In fact, the early Eurobond market might have played the role of an imperfect 
substitute to financial integration, given that capital mobility was only a secondary EU goal until 
the 1990s.26 Conversely, The 1966 Segré report was both very cognizant of the growth potential 
attached to financial integration and of the potential for this objective to be confounded by 
commercial interests.27 
 
1.  EMU membership criteria and realities 
The path to monetary integration that was adopted by the Maastricht Treaty was based on a 
three-stage process and the fulfilment of convergence criteria. Only countries, which met the 
appropriate criteria, could gain Eurozone membership. The transitional framework under the 
treaty provided some flexibility in terms of the time required for the weaker candidate economies 
to converge with the strongest, especially as regards their macroeconomic outlooks and policies. 
However, such convergence proved in many cases no more than drawing board plans.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See European Commission, The EU economy: 2003 review (Brussels: Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission, (2003) No. 6 at 320, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ publications/publication7694_en.pdf>.  
 
26 Robert Genillard, “The Eurobond Market” (1967) 23:2 Financial Analysts J. 144. The article concludes 
that the Eurobond market was a “fine example of the benefits of international collaboration by bankers in 
a fully competitive climate.” See also Kurt Richebacher, “The Problems and Prospects of Integrating 
European Capital Markets” (1969) 1:3 J. Money, Credit & Banking 337.  
 
27 See Claude Segré et al., The Development of a European Capital Market: Report of a Group of Experts 
appointed by the EEC Commission (Brussels: European Economic Community, 1966). Segré argued for 
harmonization of non-retail national markets in ways later encouraged by the Eurobond market. 
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The Maastricht Treaty’s convergence criteria included two basic conditions for euro 
membership: firstly, a three percent limit on general government annual deficit and a sixty 
percent limit on general government gross debt limit.28 It also included three other important 
criteria, which were inflation, long-term interest rates, and exchange rate fluctuations. Inflation 
was to be kept within 1.5 percent margin over that of any of the three EU countries having the 
lowest inflation rate. Long-term interest rates were to stay within a 2 percent margin over that of 
the three states with the lowest borrowing rates in the European Union.  
As regards exchange-rate fluctuations, there was a requirement of participation for two 
years in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), which provided for a narrow band of 
exchange-rate fluctuations. The reality was, however, in glaring contrast with the spirit of the 
Treaty, due to political pressures and the actual condition of the European economies, which 
even in the 1990s were mildly to grossly indebted states with considerable budget deficits.  The 
Treaty itself had exceptions to provide political leverage in extending membership to certain 
countries while restricting it to others.29 Italy, the third largest economy in continental Europe 
was running general government gross debt in 1998 at 114.9 percent of GDP (as against 60 
percent required by the Treaty), Belgium’s gross government debt (home to the EU capital, 
Brussels) was at 117.4 percent of GDP, and formation of a euro block was implausible without 
having both of these countries in the Eurozone. This makes visible a huge difference in the 
conditions of the European economies upon joining the Eurozone. In practice, these differences 
meant a much lesser degree of economic integration than had been envisaged in the earlier 
Werner (1970) and Delors reports (1989) respectively.30 Moreover, the difference in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See article 104c of The Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities Protocols. (February 07, 1992).  Maastricht:  Retrieved from 
http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtprotocols.pdf. 
29 Article 104c of the Maastricht Treaty stated that countries could exceed the 3 percent deficit target if 
‘the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference 
value’ or ‘excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to 
the reference value’. Euro area countries could similarly exceed the 60 percent gross debt target provided 
that ‘the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.’ See, 
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the Treaties Establishing the European Communities 
Protocols. (February 07, 1992).   
30 Under the Delors’ report, economic union and monetary union form two integral and equally important 
parts of a single whole and would therefore have to be implemented in parallel (Point 21 of the report) 
available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1007/1/monetary_delors.pdf However, the Delors’ report adopted a 
comparatively less centralized approach economic policy than the Werner report. 
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macroeconomic ‘initial conditions’ of the founding member states made it politically difficult to 
enforce the strict fiscal criteria laid down for EMU membership. 
 
D.  EU harmonisation legislation 1985-2009: Market Impact, Gaps and Loopholes 
Completion of the legal and regulatory framework has always been regarded as an essential 
prerequisite in the EU financial integration process. The first step towards this direction was to 
develop a harmonized set of minimum regulatory standards based on consensus.31 This seemed 
more aligned with the overall objective of achieving a single market without having to endure 
excessive concessions on idiosyncratic national policy designs and preferences, which might 
make the harmonisation process politically untenable.  
 
1.  Harmonisation principles 
The Delors Commission’s 1985 White Paper32 preceded the enactment of the first amendment to 
the Treaty of Rome in 30 years, the so-called ‘Single European Act’.33 The White Paper outlined 
the reforms required in the pre-existing EEC legal framework in order to build a truly single 
market in the EEC (as it then was) and pave the way to monetary integration.34 The White Paper 
noted at the same time that: ‘the legislation adopted by the Council and the European Parliament 
is either too detailed, or insufficiently adapted to local conditions and experience; often in stark 
contrast to the original proposals.’35 However, maximum harmonization proved impossible for 
many areas of activity in the single market and the European Commission adopted instead the 
principles of mutual recognition, minimum harmonisation, and home country control. The three 
principles were subsequently enshrined in harmonisation legislation in a number of areas, 
including financial services. The internal market was to be based on minimum harmonisation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This has been defined by one of us as the first EU financial services consensus. See Avgouleas, E 
(2005). The New EC Financial Markets Legislation and the Emerging Regime for Capital Markets. 
Yearbook of European Law, 2004, 321 -61. 
32 European Commission, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the European Commission 
to the European Council, (1985) Com(85) 310 final. 
33 Single European Act [1987] O.J. L 169/1. 
34 The Delors’ report provided for the establishment of a new monetary institution that would be called a 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) responsible to carry out monetary policy and the 
Community’s exchange rate policy vis-à-vis third currencies. 
35 Ibid. 
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national regulatory systems and mutual recognition36 through which member states would 
recognise each other’s laws, regulations, and authorities.37 Use of minimum regional 
requirements was intended to limit competitive deregulation by state actors and regulatory 
arbitrage by commercial parties.38 It was also a reflection of how political collaboration can 
encourage adoption of sound market principles and practices. 39  
The EU framework for financial services provided minimum standards for the 
establishment and operation of banks and other financial intermediaries, conduct of public offers 
on a national and pan-European basis, and extended to accounting, company law, and regulation 
of institutional investors, in the form of collective investments schemes. It also provided access 
to the single market unfettered by national borders or restrictions on activity, the so-called single 
passport facility.40 Essentially, the purpose of the passport facility was to allow intermediaries to 
deliver products or services into any part of the internal market and promote cross-border 
competition.41 As a result, the ‘passport directives’ in financial services defined the kind of 
financial intermediary to which they applied, its activities and the market segment, the conditions 
for initial and continuing authorizations, the division of regulatory responsibility between the 
home (domicile) state and the host state, and aspects of the regulatory treatment of non-EU 
member states.42 Authorized financial intermediaries that came within the ambit of one of the 
‘passport directives’ could, on the basis of the home country license, offer banking and 
investment services on a cross-border basis, without maintaining a permanent presence in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ibid.  
37 B. Steil, (1996). The European Equity Markets: The State of the Union and an Agenda for the 
Millennium. Brookings	  Institution	  Press.	  
38 Arner, D. W., & Taylor, M. W. (2010). The Global Credit Crisis and the Financial Stability Board: 
Hardening the Soft Law of International Financial Regulation? University of New South Wales Law 
Journal, 32, 488-513. 
39 Arner, D. W., Lejot, P., & Wang, W. (2009). Assessing East Asian Financial Cooperation and 
Integration. Singapore Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 12, pp. 1-42, 2009. 
40 EU financial services directives addressed issues relating to regulation of banks and banking markets, 
investment services firms, collective investment schemes, life and non-life insurance, and pension 
funds.See, Cranston, R (ed.), The Single Market and the Law of Banking (Lloyds of London Press, 2nd 
ed., 1995); Ferrarini, G (1998). European Securities Markets: The Investment Services Directive and 
Beyond,The Hague: Kluwer Law. 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid 
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target market, or through a foreign branch.43 The home state would generally be responsible for 
the licensing and supervision of financial intermediaries, for their foreign branches, and for the 
fitness and propriety of managers and major shareholders. The host state would be responsible 
for conduct within their jurisdiction or in the course of offering services cross-border to clients 
residing within their jurisdiction. 
The Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union as a successor to the EEC, 
provided an impetus for states to implement prior financial services directives and led to 
members other than Ireland and the United Kingdom adopting legislation that was often foreign 
to their traditional market practices. One important influence in the success of the harmonization 
mechanisms adopted at this stage of EU integration process was the role played by the rulings of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Being part of the EU obligated its member states to adopt 
and implement EU legislation, as national governments could be held liable in damages for 
failing to comply with EU-level decisions.44 
  
2.  The gradual shift to ‘maximum’ harmonisation 
The ‘passport directives’ have clearly enhanced financial integration in the EU, although areas of 
marked divergence, such as retail financial services, remained.45 But, minimum harmonization 
left the EU with an incomplete regulatory framework, since, in many cases, it merely augmented 
rather than replaced pre-existing national laws.46 Thus, the drive towards harmonization 
intensified in the early 2000s, following the introduction of the Euro and the publication of the 
Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in 1999.47 Arguably, the most important 
integrative instrument of that era (which can be viewed as the second EU financial services 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 A good discussion of the ambit of the provisions for investment firms may be found in Moloney, N. 
(2008). EC Securities Regulation (Oxford, 2nd edition, 2008), pp.379-460. 
44 Judgment of the Court of 19 November 1991. - Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v 
Italian Republic. - References for a preliminary ruling: Pretura di Vicenza and Pretura di Bassano del 
Grappa - Italy. - Failure to implement a directive - Liability of the Member State. - Joined cases C-6/90 
and C-9/90. European Court reports 1991 Page I-05357. Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61990J0006:EN:HTML 
45 E. Grossman and P. Leblond, “European Financial Integration: Finally the Great Leap Forward?,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 49 (2011), 413-35. 
46 See for a discussion of this issue and the gaps left behind by minimum harmonization Avgouleas, E 
(2000).  The Harmonisation of Rules of Conduct in EU Financial Markets: Economic Analysis, 
Subsidiarity and Investor Protection. European Law Journal, Vol. 6, pp. 72-92. 
47 Commission Communication, Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: 
Action Plan, COM(1999)232. 
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consensus)48 was the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID), which established 
a detailed pan-European regime with respect to conditions of establishment and operation of 
financial markets and investment intermediaries and the conduct of cross-border financial 
activities.49 National implementation of MiFID from 2007 onwards represented the third stage of 
single market development.50  
To answer a number of challenges pertaining mostly to enactment and consistent 
implementation of financial services legislation, the EU adopted the so-called Lamfalussy 
process in 2001. It consisted of four levels that started with the adoption of the framework 
legislation (Level 1) and more detailed implementing measures (Level 2). For the technical 
preparation of the implementing measures, the Commission was to be advised by the committees 
made up of representatives of national supervisory bodies from three sectors: banking, insurance 
and occupational pensions, and the securities markets. These committees were CEBS,51 
CEIOPS52 and CESR53. The level 3 committees would then contribute to the consistent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 On this and for a critical discussion of FSAP legislation see Avgouleas, E (2005). Evaluation of the 
New EC Financial Market Regulation: Peaks and Troughs in the Road Ahead. Transnational Lawyer Vol. 
18, pp. 179-228. 
49 EC, Directive 2004/39/EC 2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 
[2007] O.J. L 145/1. For a discussion of the contours of MiFID see Avgouleas, E (ed.), The Regulation of 
Investment Services in Europe under MiFiD: Implementation and Practice (Tottel, 2008). 
50 Mads Andenas, Douglas Arner & Mei-wah Leung, “The Future of the European Single Market for 
Financial Services” AIIFL Working Paper No. 8, online: http:www.aiifl.com.  
51 The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) as an independent advisory group on 
banking supervision in the European Union was established by the European Commission in 2004 by 
Decision 2004/5/EC (the Commission’s decision dated November 2003 is available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/financial_services_banki
ng/l22025_en.htm) On 1 January 2011, this committee was replaced by the European Banking Authority 
(EBA), which took over all existing and ongoing tasks and responsibilities of the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS). The European Banking Authority was established by Regulation (EC) No. 
1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 available 
at:http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/EBA-en.pdf?79016e649558f0a9a741da6c169b806b  
52 CEIOPS (2003-2010) was established under the European Commission's Decision 2004/6/EC of 5 
November 2003. In January 2011 CEIOPS was replaced by EIOPA under the Decision 2009/79/EC in 
accordance with the new European financial supervision framework. 
53 The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) was an independent committee of European 
Securities regulators established by European Commission on June 6 of 2001. On 1 January 2011, CESR 
was replaced by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in accordance with the new 
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implementation of Community directives in the Member States, ensuring effective cooperation 
between the supervisory authorities and convergence of their practices (Level 3) and finally, the 
Commission was to enforce timely and correct transposition of EU legislation into national laws 
(Level 4).54  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the EU has introduced a number of pan-
European bodies with regulatory competences, the most important of which is the development 
of a common rulebook.55 The new institutions that the EU has built since 2009 are discussed in 
the following sections. 
 
III.  The Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Debt Crisis 
As mentioned earlier, it was not until the 2008 crisis and in earnest after the outbreak of the 
Eurozone debt crisis in 2010 that the vexed issue of preservation of financial stability in an 
integrated market came to the forefront of EU policy-makers’ attention. Both crises have 
emphasized the need to revisit existing models of financial market integration with a view of 
enriching them with institutions and structures that underpin financial stability as well as 
economic growth. It should be noted here that the Maastricht Treaty (1992) did not include 
‘financial stability’ as a key objective of the ECB, although, article 127(5) of TFEU underscores 
the ‘financial stability’ as a classic central banking good. Thus, financial stability has not been 
designed as one of the four basic tasks to be carried through the ESCB (article 127(2) of TFEU) 
and has rather been clustered with prudential supervision under the ‘non-binding tasks’ of the 
ECB.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
European financial supervision framework. See more at 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/index.php?page=cesrinshort&mac=0&id= 
54 See, Lamfalussy, A. (2001). Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of 
European Securities Markets Brussels, 15 February 2001, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men_en.pdf. 
For a review on the process recommendations, see also, Ferran, E. (2010). Understanding the New 
Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision. In G.Ferrarini, K.J.Hopt & E.Wymeersch 
(Eds.), Rethinking Financial Regulation and Supervision in Times of Crisis (OUP, 2012), Ch. 5, where 
Ferran examines the recent EU institutional reforms on financial market supervision to assess their 
significance. See also, Schaub, A. (2004). The Lamfalussy process four years on. Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance, 13(2), 110 - 120. 
55 See ‘Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU’, February 2009 (the de 
Larosière report), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf 
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A. Background	  
Until the onset of the GFC in 2008, the ‘common passport facility’ was at the heart of the EU 
single market. The EU legislative framework based on harmonized standards for financial 
markets sought equivalence among disparate regulatory and legal systems, so that regional 
initiatives could recognise national legal and regulatory regimes.56 But a multi-level governance 
system involves far more complexities than a regime based on minimum harmonisation can 
foresee. These mainly arise out of the conflicting and sometimes misunderstood national 
priorities and transnational requirements. Even before the current crisis, the European Union was 
viewed by some as a ‘too intrusive’ and ‘remote’ institution in need of a more coherent set of 
policies within existing treaties.57  
Political considerations also undermined the credibility of rule-based frameworks for 
coordination of national fiscal policies in the euro area.58 For example, the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) was originally designed to safeguard sound public finances and to thwart individual 
Eurozone members from adopting fiscal policies leading to unsustainable debt levels by 
enforcing budgetary discipline. Nonetheless, France and Germany, faced with a breach of the 3 
percent deficit limit in 2002-04, pushed through a watering down of the SGP rules by March 
2005. Arguably, the Maastricht Treaty itself allowed sufficient flexibility to the interpretation of 
SGP and its enforcement as to allow it to become part of the political bargaining process in the 
EU at the expense of objective economic criteria.59 As a result, during the period that the debt 
crisis was building up, the Eurozone was deeply marked by economic and financial imbalances 
and the Union itself lacked a central fiscal authority, which would have afforded it a credible 
mechanism to enforce budget discipline. In addition, trade imbalances due to accelerating 
competitiveness imbalances and lack of exchange rate flexibility meant that there were no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See, B Steil, The European Equity Markets: The State of the Union and an Agenda for the Millennium 
(Brookings Institution Press, 1996), 113 
57 COM. (2001). European Governance - A White Paper.  Brussels: Commission of the European 
Communities. P12 
58 See, Bergsten, C. F., & Kirkegaard, J. F. (2012). The coming resolution of the European crisis 
[electronic resource] Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C   Retrieved from 
http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/iie/0024277/f_0024277_19801.pdf 
59European Council Presidency Conclusions, Council of the European Union. (March 22-23, 2005).  
Brussels:  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/84335.pdf. 
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realistic prospects for fiscal convergence.60 Yet, preserving, in the long-term, any currency 
union, including the EMU, requires a sufficient level of economic convergence, together with a 
properly functioning internal market, and an effective system for economic and budgetary policy 
surveillance and coordination.  
 Accordingly, when the GFC broke out with force, European financial stability was 
hampered by a number of pre-existing problems which had simply been ignored for far too long. 
These included colossal pre-crisis public and private debt piles, a flawed macroeconomic 
framework, and absence of institutions capable of handling effectively a cross-border banking 
crisis. The incomplete institutional design was the true mark of an ‘imbalanced’ and disjointed 
monetary union, also characterized by the absence of effective fiscal convergence mechanisms. 
Namely, during the first decade of its life, the EMU was premised on a weak institutional 
framework that was more suitable to a ‘fair weather currency’,61 rather than a monetary union 
with asymmetrical member economies, which were about to experience massive macro-
economic shocks. It assumed that any macroeconomic or banking system stability shocks could 
be dealt with at the national level without requiring any transfers from the strongest to the 
weaker members of the Eurozone, due to the no bailout clause in the EMU Treaty.62 
Consequently, the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone in 2010 meant that the 
EU had to enter into the most transformative phase of its history.   
While the 2008 crisis intensified reform efforts to a great extent, the true big bang for the 
mooted pan-European supervisory and bank resolution structures has been the ensuing Eurozone 
debt crisis, which has shaken to its foundations the banking system of the eurozone. The EU had 
to devise mechanisms, in the midst of crisis, firstly, to prevent an immediate meltdown of its 
banking sector and ensuing chain of sovereign bankruptcies and, secondly, to reform its flawed 
institutions, in order to prevent the Eurozone architecture from collapsing. Namely, Eurozone 
members had to build both a crisis-fighting capacity and support bailout funding mechanisms. 
This has led to the establishment of a European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which will be 
superseded by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).  At the same time, serious steps have 
been taken to build a European Banking Union based on structures safeguarding centralization of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See P. de Grawe (2012). Economics of Monetary Union. Oxford University Press, 9th ed., part 2. 
61 Bergsten, C. F., & Kirkegaard, J. F. (2012). Ibid 
62 See Art. 101 TEU (now enshrined in Art. 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
2008). 
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bank supervision and uniform deposit insurance arrangements, as well as centralization of crisis-
resolution.  
 
B.  Problems of Integration – Cross-border banking 
The premise of home-country control and the principle of minimum harmonization were bound 
to undermine at some point the stability of the EU banking system. The integration process 
continued in an increasingly de-regulated market following the intensification of liberalization 
efforts in the last quarter of the 20th century, but the regulatory standards and supervisory 
principles were not adjusted to new realities. The Eurozone crisis has brought home with 
devastating force the potential risks of financial market integration, which inevitably leads 
financial institutions operating in the single market to develop very tight links of 
interconnectedness, allowing thus shocks appearing in one part of the market to be transmitted 
widely and quickly across all other parts. Examples of such rapid transmission of shocks include 
the failure of Icelandic banks, the botched rescue of Fortis bank, the threat of collapse of the 
financial systems of Ireland and Spain, and the possibility of a sovereign default (e.g., Greece), 
or of a chain of sovereign defaults. Each of those crises brought serious tremors to European 
markets and exposed their fragility and the dearth of policy options available to Eurozone 
decision-makers. Naturally, the rapid amplification of those crises and their grave consequences 
has raised serious questions regarding the survival of Eurozone.  
In the US the response to the crisis was rapid and came in the form of state purchase of 
distressed bank assets so-called Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP), innovative 
intervention schemes by the Federal Reserve, and (complex) re-regulation of the financial sector. 
In the EU however, the diversity of member state economies and issues arising out of inherent 
contradictions between national policy priorities meant a much lower degree of responsiveness to 
the crisis. This became evident as soon as some of the EMU states, which experienced a more 
severe crisis than other members had to adopt policies based on their own national needs and 
interests – which may not be necessarily have been in conformity with single market policies. 
For example, lack of common deposit insurance in a well-integrated banking market at a time of 
cross-border crisis led to several conflicting policy choices and responses in an effort by the 
states to protect their own citizens.  
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1. The Icelandic banking crisis 
The collapse of the Icelandic banks - Glitnir, Kaupthing and Landsbanki63 – which operated 
branches in EU member states on the basis of the single passport presents a classic case of home 
country control failure and of the disastrous consequences of lack of centralized supervision and 
resolution mechanisms in the EU. The single passport, also afforded to European Economic Area 
countries (such as Iceland, which is not an EU member), gave Icelandic banks the ability to 
expand their assets and deposit base through branches and through internet-based operations 
offering cross-border banking services. As European depositors were lured by the high interest 
rates offered by Icelandic banks, gradually Icelandic banks built a large depositor base in certain 
European countries.  
However, by 2008 both the country’s economy and even more its banks were in serious 
trouble. While trouble was brewing over several months Icelandic bank operations within the EU 
were supervised by the home country authorities, which were unwilling to take any radical 
restructuring or rescue measures, thus, nothing was done to prevent the ensuing panic. So when 
Icelandic banks faced difficulties in refinancing their short-term debt, a run on the Icelandic 
bank’s deposits in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom became inevitable, as domestic 
depositors were not covered by the deposit protection scheme of their home countries. While 
both the Netherlands and the UK, were, in the beginning unwilling to extend protection to 
Icelandic bank depositors, at the same time, Iceland could provide no comfort to foreign 
depositors, because it was already in the middle of a deep financial crisis, and its government did 
not want to pay for the mistakes made by private banks with the assistance of politicians and of 
‘home’ supervisory authorities. Harsh responses followed both from the UK and Netherlands 
authorities,64 which, though entirely necessary, annulled the single passport principle. In order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The collapse followed from difficulties in refinancing their short-term debt and a run on deposits in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
64 The UK used provisions in sections 4 and 14 and Schedule 3 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001 to issues a freezing order over Landsbanki assets.  The Landsbanki Freezing Order 2008 was 
passed at 10 am on 8 October 2008 and came into force ten minutes later. Under the order the UK 
Treasury froze the assets of Landsbanki within the UK, to prevent the sale or movement of Landsbanki 
assets within the UK, even if held by the Central Bank of Iceland or the Government of Iceland. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008%E2%80%932012_Icelandic_financial_crisis - cite_note-55 See, Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, retrieved, November 24, 2012 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/contents. 
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prevent the crisis spreading to the British banking system the UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown 
extended protection to British depositors, which essentially meant that the British deposit 
protection scheme would cover the loss. Thus, the UK Treasury proceeded with the 
unprecedented step of issuing a compulsory freezing order of Icelandic bank assets and deposits 
under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which, of course, antagonized 
relationships with Iceland. In addition, the UK government announced that it would launch legal 
action against Iceland over any losses connected to the compensation of an estimated 300,000 
UK savers.65 Icelandic authorities later reached an agreement separately with both the UK and 
the government of the Netherlands. Thus, Iceland will be paying the UK and Netherlands a 
percentage of GDP from 2019-23 to compensate for the deposit protection made available by 
these two countries to their own consumers holding deposits in Icelandic banks. 
The collapse of Icelandic banks led to economic crisis and the mishandling of the crisis 
brought down the political machinery of the government. The Icelandic banking crisis and the 
more recent Cyprus banking crisis hold serious lessons as they underscore the risks arising from 
the ‘nurturing’ of over-grown financial sectors which much outstrip a country’s GDP, although 
this irrefutable does place smaller country industries into a disadvantageous competitive 
position.66  
 
2. The fractious rescue of Fortis Bank 
When the collapse of Lehman Brothers hit global markets, Fortis -- a big European bank with 
strong cross-border presence in France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg -- came very 
close to collapse.67  In Belgium, Fortis was the country's biggest private sector employer and 
more than 1.5 million households -- about half the country -- banked with the group. In 2007, 
Fortis had acquired parts of ABN AMRO through a consortium with Royal Bank of Scotland and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Marshall, Chris; Martin, Iain (October 08, 2008). “UK government launching legal action against 
Iceland.”http://www.citywire.co.uk/money/update-uk-govt-launching-legal-action-against-
iceland/a316803, retrieved on November 24, 2011 
66 Another lesson that the Icelandic banks crisis might hold is that default in the face of mounting and 
unreasonable debt might not be such a bad thing. By mid-2012 Iceland is regarded as one of Europe's 
recovery success stories. It has had two years of economic growth. Unemployment is down to 6.3% and 
Iceland is attracting immigrants to fill jobs. 
67 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border 
Bank Resolution Group’, Basel, September 2009, p. 10. 
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Santander. In 2008, Fortis had difficulties realising its plans to strengthen its financial position. 
Over the summer of 2008, its share price deteriorated and liquidity became a serious concern. 
Insolvency fears saw Fortis’ shares to fall to their lowest level in more than a decade and its 
shares gradually lost more than three-quarters of their value.  
Fortis was deemed to be systemically relevant in the three countries. Thus, the ECB and 
ministers from the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg agreed to put 11.2bn euros ($16.1bn; 
£8.9bn) into Fortis to save the bank. As part of the weekend deal to rescue Fortis, the bank would 
have to sell its stake in the Dutch bank ABN Amro, which it had partially taken over the 
previous year. The Fortis deal would have seen Belgium contribute 4.7bn euros, the Netherlands 
4bn euros and Luxembourg 2.5bn euros. However, European bank shares fell sharply on worries 
that other banks could have problems, and on concerns over the 700bn dollars bailout plan in the 
United States (TARP). One of the biggest casualties was Fortis' rival Dexia, which French and 
Belgian governments also promised to step in to support. Eventually the joint rescue of Fortis 
broke down along national lines and each of the three countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg) concentrated only on the part of the group that was most important for their 
market,68 in defiance of single market principles/ideals. 
 
C.  The Eurozone Debt Crisis 
In Europe, the banking and liquidity crisis soon transformed into a complex and multilayered 
crisis. As soon as a series of public bailouts took the issue of the continuing solvency of UK, US, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 (Emphasis added). The Dutch government purchased Fortis Bank Netherlands, Fortis Insurance 
Netherlands, Fortis Corporate Insurance and the Fortis share in ABN AMRO. The Belgian government 
raised its holding in Fortis Bank Belgium up to 99%. ‘The Belgian government also agreed to sell a 75% 
interest to BNP Paribas (BNP) in return for new BNP shares, keeping a blocking minority of 25% of the 
capital of Fortis Bank Belgium. BNP also bought the Belgian insurance activities of Fortis and took a 
majority stake in Fortis Bank Luxembourg. A portfolio of structured products was transferred to a 
financial structure owned by the Belgian State, BNP and Fortis Group.’ BCBS, Report and 
Recommendations, p. 10. On 12 December 2008, the Court of Appeal of Brussels suspended the sale to 
BNP, which was not yet finalised, and decided that the finalised sales to the Dutch State and to the 
Belgian State as well as the subsequent sale to BNP had to be submitted for approval by the shareholders 
of Fortis Holding in order for these three sales to be valid under Belgian Law. After initial rejection by the 
shareholders, certain transactions were renegotiated and financing of the portfolio of structured products 
was modified. The renegotiated transaction with the Belgian State and BNP was approved at the second 
general meeting of shareholders and the latter transaction was finalised on 12 May 2009. Ibid.	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and major European banks out of the limelight, the state of Irish and Spanish banks and the 
possibility of a Greek default brought the lurking woes of the Eurozone into sharp focus. Ireland 
and Greece have essentially triggered the second and more lethal wave of the crisis of confidence 
that has hit most of Europe since 2010 - although Italy and Spain might in the end prove much 
bigger threats to Eurozone’s survival than Greece, Portugal and Ireland, which represent only a 
very small faction of Eurozone GDP. The Eurozone crisis should be be seen as a sequence of 
four interlocking crises resulting from imbalanced monetary integration. This resulted in a 
competitiveness crisis that transformed into a marked loss of fiscal revenues and widening fiscal 
deficits which led to debt accumulations (particularly in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) that 
were financed by the surpluses of the northern countries, reflecting, in turn, to massive payment 
imbalances within the Eurozone (in particular, Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland vis-à-vis 
the European South). As said surpluses had to be re-invested, they found their way to 
investments in the bonds of deficit countries (Greece, Italy) or to the banking systems of the 
Eurozone periphery (Ireland, Spain) and financed gigantic real estate bubbles in Ireland and 
Spain. Thus, they led to accumulation of unsustainable levels of public or private debt or both.69 
The Eurozone crisis has signaled a fundamental shift in the political dynamics 
underpinning the EU. While the exact remedies of the crisis, austerity, more integration, 
mutualization of Eurozone members’ debt and other measures remain the topic of heated 
discussion, one remedy is viewed as uncontroversial. Namely, it is quite beyond dispute that the 
Eurozone crisis would have been much less severe, if Eurozone members could find a way to 
break up the link between bank debt and sovereign indebtedness, which, of course, created a 
vicious circle of ever more bank bailouts and ever-higher levels of national debt. The fact that 
many EU banks had invested in EU members’ bonds and are also adversely affected by the 
continuous recession ravaging the periphery of the Eurozone has only made things worse. 
However, the EMU, although it had interest rate setting competence through the European 
Central Bank, has until recently been devoid of any binding mechanism to effectively enforce 
fiscal and banking stability, both areas of serious national interest where pooling of sovereignty 
was regarded, until recently, as intolerable. Namely, since its establishment the EMU lacked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Avgouleas, E. (July 2012). Eurozone Crisis and Sovereign Debt restructuring: Intellectual Fallacies and 
New Lines of Research. Paper presented at the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL), 3rd 
Biennial Global Conference, Centre for International Law (CIL) and Faculty of Law, at National 
University of Singapore. 
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these crucial supporting institutions that could have helped it to restore financial stability during 
times of acute uncertainty and market volatility.70 More specifically, the EMU lacked suitable 
institutions that could absorb liquidity shocks, due to a collapse of confidence in the prospects of 
a member state’s economy, and cross-border supervisory and resolution structures that could 
effectively deal with the cross-border spillover effects of a bank collapse.  
In order to break the vicious circle between bank bailouts and levels of sovereign 
indebtedness, the Eurozone members have established a funding facility, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), which, subject to a strict conditionality, will be employed to directly 
recapitalize Eurozone banks. The use of ESM funds for such recapitalisations would put to a stop 
to further increases of the indebtedness of the sovereign concerned due to bank bailouts. The 
inevitable transfer of payments from the richer to the weaker Eurozone members through the 
ESM, which enjoys the guarantee of all Eurozone members, and the need to tighten the 
framework for bank regulation, supervision, and resolution have meant that the countries in the 
core of the Eurozone have promoted the centralization of bank supervision and resolution 
functions in the EMU. These demands have given birth to a new set of bank authorization, 
supervision and resolution arrangements: the European Banking Union. However, the European 
Banking Union, plausible and necessary as it may be, has also reinforced rather than calmed the 
centrifugal forces within the EU and has the potential to lead to a serious split of the internal 
market.71 Important members of the EU, chiefly the UK, have resolutely remained outside 
important European Banking Union arrangements. It is, thus, reasonable to infer that political 
expediency, and not economic necessities, will, in the end seal the fate of the single currency.  
 
III.  EU Financial Regulation Infrastructure in the post-2009 period: Phase I – From the 
Lamfalussy Process to the ESFS 
 
A. The Larosiere Reforms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Bergsten, C. F., & Kirkegaard, J. F. (2012). The coming resolution of the European crisis [electronic 
resource] Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C Retrieved from 
http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/iie/0024277/f_0024277_19801.pdf 
71 Lastra, R. (2013).  Banking Union and Single Market: Conflict or Companionship?, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 36, forthcoming. 
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In November 2008 the Commission appointed a High Level Group (chaired by Jacques de 
Larosiere) to study the Lamfalussy framework in light of the GFC and the threats to cross-border 
banking and the internal market that the GFC uncovered, and to make recommendations for a 
new EU regulatory set up.72 The proposals advanced by the de Larosière report were 
instrumental to subsequent developments. In order to implement the recommendations of the de 
Larosiere committee the EU established (through a series of Regulations, normally referred to as 
the ESAs founding Regulations) an integrated European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS), which came into effect in December 2010.73 It comprises the European Systemic Risk 
Board74 and a decentralized network comprising existing national supervisors (who would 
continue to carry out day-to-day supervision) and three new European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs): the European Banking Authority (EBA),75 the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pension Authority (EIOPA), and the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA), which 
respectively replaced the corresponding Lamfalussy Level 3 Committees: CEBS,76 CEIOPS77 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Larosiere, J. d. (February 2009). Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU. 
Brussels: European Union. 
73 Article 2, ESA founding Regulations, see, Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission 
Decision 2009/77/EC. (2010) (pp. 84-119): Official Journal of the European Union, available at 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/Reg_716_2010_ESMA.pdf.  
74 The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), established on 16 December 2010 in response to the 
ongoing financial crisis. It has been tasked with the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system 
within the Union in order to contribute to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to financial 
stability in the Union. It was established under the EU Regulation No 1092/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24/11/2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the 
financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (the ‘ESRB Regulation’). The 
Regulation is available at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/ESRB-
en.pdf?efba86ec695eea33d6b673acc62578d9  
75 The European Banking Authority was established by Regulation (EC) No. 1093/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 available 
at:http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/EBA-en.pdf?79016e649558f0a9a741da6c169b806b 
76 The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) as an independent advisory group on 
banking supervision in the European Union was established by the European Commission in 2004 by 
Decision 2004/5/EC (the Commission’s decision dated November 2003 is available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/financial_services_banki
ng/l22025_en.htm) On 1 January 2011, this committee was succeeded by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), which took over all existing and ongoing tasks and responsibilities of the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS).  
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and CESR.78 Furthermore, colleges of supervisors79 were to be put in place for all major cross-
border institutions because supervision of strategic decisions at the consolidated level requires a 
college of supervisors to understand the global effects and externalities of those decisions.80 Last 
but not least, a Joint Committee was formed by the European Supervisory Authorities to 
coordinate their actions on cross-sectoral rule-making and supervisory matters. 
ESAs’ work with the newly established European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to ensure 
financial stability and to strengthen and enhance the EU supervisory framework. Apart from 
issuing guidance and recommendations to national supervisors,81 ESAs also seek to formulate a 
single EU rulebook and harmonise technical standards on the basis of powers conferred by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 CEIOPS (2003-2010) was established under the European Commission's Decision 2004/6/EC of 5 
November 2003, which has been replaced by EIOPA. 
78 The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) was an independent committee of European 
Securities regulators established by European Commission on June 6 of 2001. On 1 January 2011, CESR 
was replaced by the ESMA.  
79 The colleges are a mechanism for the exchange of information between home and host authorities, for 
the planning and performance of key supervisory tasks in a coordinated manner or jointly, including all 
aspects of ongoing supervision, and also for the preparation for and the handling of emergency situations.. 
These are permanent, although flexible, structures for cooperation and coordination among the EU 
authorities responsible for and involved in the supervision of the different components of cross-border 
groups, specifically large groups. See for the operating principles of the colleges  
http://www.eba.europa.eu/Supervisory-Colleges/Introduction.aspx and, Colleges of Supervisors – 10 
Common Principles. (January 27, 2009) (Vol. CEIOPS-SEC-54/08, CEBS 2008 124, IWCFC 08 32): 
http://eba.europa.eu/getdoc/aeecaf1a-81b5-476a-95dd-599c5e967697/Clean-V3-formatted-CEBS-2008-
124-CEIOPS-SEC-08-54-.aspx.  
80 In a sense this followed similar propositions as to how regulation of cross-border banking in the EU had 
to be structured. See, Lamanda, C. (March 2009). Cross-Border Banking in Europe: what regulation and 
supervision? Unicredit Group Forum on Financial Cross-border Groups, Discussion paper No 01, 
available at https://www.unicreditgroup.eu/content/dam/unicreditgroup/documents/inc/press-and-
media/cross_border_banking_discussion_paper.pdf. Lamanda’s Report had suggested that the 
supervision of cross-border banks had to be based on three tiers: day-to-day supervision to continue with 
national supervisors as it requires supervisors to be close to a business; strategic decisions, affecting the 
entire group to be supervised by colleges of supervisors, with enhanced, legally binding supervisory 
powers for each cross-border institution; and, a European Banking Authority (EBA), whose 
independence, governance and mechanisms follow the proposal of the de Larosiere Group. For banks 
within the Eurozone it is expected that the colleges will become largely redundant once bank supervision 
is centralized under the Single supervisory Mechanism the first pillar of the European Banking Union to 
come into effect in 2014. 
81 Article 8, defining tasks and powers of the Authority; See also, Article 10-17, ESA founding 
Regulations. 
	   27	  
EU commission,82 which subsequently will be adopted by the European Commission to become 
formal/binding EU law.83 To safeguard consistent application of harmonized legislation, if the 
ESAs find a national supervisory authority failing to apply EU law, they have the power to 
investigate infractions, with the relevant Authority having the power to directly issue 
recommendations to national supervisors to remedy potential infractions, followed by a formal 
opinion from the Commission (if the recommendation is not acted upon). If the supervisor does 
not comply with the Commission’s formal opinion, the ESA may then take decisions directly 
binding on firms or market participants concerned to ensure that they comply with EU law. In 
adverse situations, ESAs have wider-ranging powers.84 In a crisis, the ESAs will provide EU-
wide coordination.85 If an emergency is declared, the ESAs may make decisions that are binding 
on national supervisors and on firms. The ESAs will mediate in certain situations where national 
supervisory authorities disagree. If necessary, they will be able to resolve disputes by making a 
decision that is binding on both of the parties to ensure compliance with EU law.86 They have a 
role in EU supervisory colleges to ensure that they function efficiently and that consistent 
approaches and practices are followed.87 The ESAs will conduct regular peer reviews of national 
supervisory authorities across the EU.88 They will be able to collect information from national 
supervisors to allow them to fulfill their role.89 This information will be used for analyzing 
market developments, coordinating EU-wide stress tests and the macro prudential analysis 
undertaken by the ESRB.90 They also have a remit to consider consumer protection issues.91 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Article 11, exercise of delegation, ESA founding Regulations. 
83 Article 10, Regulatory Technical Standards, ESA founding Regulation. 
84 Article 18, Action in emergency situations, ESA founding Regulations. 
85 Article 31, Coordination function, ESA founding Regulations. 
86 Article 19, Settlement of disagreements between competent authorities in cross-border situations, and 
also, Article 20, Settlement of disagreements between competent authorities across sectors; Article 21, 
Colleges of supervisors, ESA founding regulations. 
87 Article 29, Common supervisory culture; Article 27, European system of resolution and funding 
arrangements, ESA founding Regulations. 
88 Article 30, Peer reviews of competent authorities, ESA founding Regulations. 
89 Article 36, Relationship with the ESRB, ESA founding Regulations. 
90 Article 36, Relationship with the ESRB, and, Article 23 Identification and measurement of systemic 
risk, ESA founding Regulations. See also Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial 
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board. (2010) Official Journal of the European Union 
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the ensuing paragraphs we provided a more analytical overview of the competences discharged 
by the ESRB and the ESAs. 
  
1. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
One of the recommendations of the de Larosiere report was to take stock of systemic risk factors 
that have been affecting the stability of the EU financial system as a whole. This made necessary 
the establishment of an EU-level body tasked with macro-prudential risk assessment. On 16 
December 2010, Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 established a European Systemic Risk Board 
(the ESRB Regulation) as an independent body with no legal personality and with no legally 
binding powers, hosted by the ECB, which directs its work and chairs the meetings.  
The ESRB aims at detection of excessive risk accumulation, improving surveillance and 
supervision. Thus, its principal task is to conduct operations consisting of prediction, assessment 
management, and prevention and control of systemic risk and to collect and analyze all the 
relevant and necessary information, identify and prioritize systemic risks,92 issue warnings where 
such systemic risks are deemed to be significant,93 and, issue recommendations for remedial 
action and, where appropriate, making those recommendations public.94 The ESRB can 
determine an emergency situation where it may issue a confidential warning addressed to the 
European Council. This should provide the Council with an assessment of the situation95 in order 
to enable the Council to adopt a decision addressed to the European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs) determining the existence of an emergency situation.96 It is for the Council – and not for 
the ESRB, which serves only the advisory function- to make decisions on such emergencies. The 
ESRB works in close cooperation with several other parties to the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS),97 including the EU Commission and EU Economic and Financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Vol. L331/1): available at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/ESRB-
en.pdf?49c9d3be4e6566e3eb2c1f0b210d4980. [Hereinafter ESRB Regulation].  
 
91 Article 9, Tasks related to consumer protection and financial activities; Article 26, European system of 
national Investor Compensation Schemes, ESA founding Regulations. 
92 Article 3, ESRB Regulation. 
93 Article 3, and Article 16, ESRB Regulation. 
94 Article 3 and Article 16, ESRB Regulation. 
95 Article 3, ESRB Regulation. 
96 Recital 22, ESRB Regulation 
97 Article 16, ESRB Regulation.  
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Committee (EFC) for surveillance.98 Jointly with the European Council it performs a collective 
oversight for systemic stability policies and it co-operates with the IMF, BIS, and FSB to 
identify and assess SIFIs in the EU.99 Moreover, in collaboration with the ESAs, it maintains a 
common set of quantitative and qualitative indicators (risk dashboard) to identify and measure 
systemic risk.100  
Naturally, there are ambiguities surrounding the ESRB’s role. First, ESRB’s very low 
visibility almost tow years after it ‘opened for business’, shows that, in practice, it is not the 
paramount macro-prudential regulator in the EU.  Secondly, since it is a soft law body with 
informal status, it is very much dependent for information collection on national supervisory and 
regulatory authorities. The ESRB’s dependence on other bodies to carry out some of its tasks and 
above all its mandate also implies that it may easily become involved in national and European 
level political struggles and reputation damaging litigation. Secondly, because of the ESRB’s 
closeness with the ECB, which is it the effective lender of last resort in the Eurozone, its 
credibility and independence may further be compromised by the ECB’s policy priorities.101 It 
should be noted here that the ECB – unlike traditional central banks who are endowed with 
powers to employ both monetary policy and LoLR instruments in response to financial crisis – 
though it has a clear role with respect to monetary policy (Article 127(2) TFEU, and Article 18 
of the ESCB Statute), it has a very limited mandate vis-à-vis the discharge of LoLR powers. 
Also, until the ESM moves into full action, only fiscal authorities can effect bailouts using 
taxpayers’ money.102 The absence of fiscal union/ powers in the Eurozone therefore, poses an 
additional constraint to the ECB apart from the restrictions that the Treaty itself provides to 
deliver effectively as LoLR in Eurozone crisis. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 See, Dierick, F., Lennartsdotter, P., & Favero, P. D. (2012). The ESRB at work—its role, organization 
and functioning. Macro-prudential Commentaries, ESRB(1), available at 
http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/commentaries/ESRB_commentary_1202.pdf 
99 Article 3, ESRB Regulation. 
100 Article 3, ESRB Regulation. 
101 Avgouleas, E. (2012). Another perspective is raised by Goodhart and Franklin Allen et.al., who argue 
that the ECB might not necessarily be a ‘tougher supervisor’ than national authorities. See Goodhart, C. 
and Allen, F.  in Beck, T. (2012). Banking Union for Europe Risks and Challenges, [electronic resource], 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Retrieved from 
http://www.dsf.nl/assets/cms/File/Events/Thorsten%20Beck_Banking_Union.pdf Pp 105-119 
102 See, Goodhart, C. (2003). The Political Economy of Financial Harmonisation in Europe. In J. Kremer, 
D. Schoenmaker & P. Wierts (Eds.), Financial Supervision in Europe: : Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
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2. European Banking Authority (EBA)  
The European Banking Authority was established by Regulation (EC) No. 1093/2010 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010103 and has officially started 
operations as of 1 January 2011. Having taken over the tasks and responsibilities of the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), EBA acts as a hub and support network 
of EU and member state national bodies, safeguarding the stability of the financial system, the 
transparency of markets and financial products and the protection of depositors and investors.  
Regulation, oversight, and consumer Protection are the core functions of the EBA as laid 
down in the EBA Regulation. The fundamental objective of EBA is to develop a single European 
supervisory and recovery and resolution rulebook, in order to achieve a level playing field for 
financial institutions and raise the quality of financial regulation and the overall functioning of 
the Single Market. EBA’s oversight activities focus on identifying, analyzing and addressing key 
risks in the EU banking sector to strengthen European supervision of cross-border banking 
groups. EBA is also committed to enhance consumer protection and promote transparency, 
simplicity and fairness for consumers of financial products and services across the Single 
Market.104  
 
3.  Evaluation 
The ECB together with the Central Banks of the EU Member States (NCBs) comprises the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). This configuration produces in itself structural 
complexity,105 which has its roots in the dual role performed by the NCBs. The NCBs are 
national agencies while performing non-ESCB functions and at the same time, NCBs constitute 
an important part of the ESCB and play a role in the conduct of EMU monetary policy. This 
functional complexity has deeper roots that relate to their constitutive laws. Whereas the ECB 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC.  (Vol. 331/12): Official Journal of the 
European Union, available at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/EBA-
en.pdf?79016e649558f0a9a741da6c169b806b.  
104 See, EBA Work Program 2013. (28 September 2012) (Vol. EBA BS 2012 163 FINAL): The European 
Banking Authority, available at 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/cebs/media/aboutus/Work%20Programme/EBA-BS-2012-163-FINAL--EBA-
work-programme-for-2013-.pdf. 
105 Lastra, R. M., & Louis, J.-V. (2013). 
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operates solely under the EC law, while the status of the NCBs is governed by both the EC law 
and national legislation. In addition, no provision was made, until the advent of the EBU, for the 
ECB to have any regulatory oversight over cross-border banks. The ESFS did not remedy the 
‘mismatch’ between the geographic scope of European bank activities and the regulatory remit 
of the authorities supervising them. On the contrary, the ESFS might be accused of just 
providing yet another layer of complexity in the EU structures. Therefore, even after the 
implementation of the de Larosiere reforms, cross-border supervision and bank resolution at the 
EU level remained decentralized and in want of further clarifications as to how ESAs would be 
able to control and manage their complicated tasks when parties involved would include non-EU 
countries.  
Finally, he structures developed under the ESFS for cross-border bank supervision 
remain complex and involve too many levels of over-lapping competences that may lead to 
critical delays during a crisis.106 And then, if any major European bank or a financial institution 
fails, it would certainly have repercussions outside EU,107 though no provision is made for 
formalized cooperation structures with third country regulators beyond those provided in the 
(informal) context of the G20 and the Financial Stability Board. The most important international 
co-operation issue is of course the need to draw up clear fiscal burden sharing arrangements.108  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 E.g., Jamie Dimon has raised a very pertinent question with respect to the effectiveness of regulatory 
reforms: “ has anyone bothered to study the cumulative effect of these regulatory and market fixes?” on 
June 07, 2011. Ben Bernanke, the Fed Chairman issues a statement, as reproduced by Barth, “the central 
bank doesn’t have the quantitative tools to study the net impact of all the regulatory and market changes 
over the last three years…It’s too complicated” to study the new regulations’ effect. Reproduced in Barth, 
J. R., & Prabha, A. P. (December 03, 2012). Moreover, James Barth contends that not everyone is 
convinced of the new regulations in place (in case of the US, the Dodd-Frank Act) has solved the too-big-
to-fail problem, yet, the biggest banks have not been downsized despite the presence of a general 
consensus from various stake-holders. He quotes from Sheila Bair (Former FDIC Chair, Fortune, 
February 06, 2012), Richard Fischer & Harvey Rosenblum (FRB of Dallas, Wall Street Journal, April 4, 
2012), and, Simon Johnson (Professor at MIT, Bloomberg, October 10, 2011). See, Barth, J. R., & 
Prabha, A. P. (December 03, 2012). Breaking (Banks) Up is Hard to Do: New Perspectives on Too Big to 
fail. Financial Institutions Centre.  Retrieved from http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/12/12-16.pdf  
107 See, Beck, T. (25 October 2011). The Future of Banking, A VoxEU.org eBook   Retrieved from 
http://www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/the_future_of_banking.pdf 
108 Goodhart and Schoenmaker have proposed binding burden-sharing arrangement among national 
governments. If a cross-border bank faces difficulties, the governments would share the costs according to 
some predetermined key – for example, according to the distribution of the troubled bank’s assets over 
the respective countries. Under such a burden sharing approach, a common solution can be found upfront. 
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Moreover, even under the EFSF extensive reliance is being placed on the judgment and 
decisions of the home supervisor.109 A binding mediation mechanism is required to deal with 
such cross-border supervisory problems. Without such an effective and binding mechanism, 
some Member States might in the future try to limit the branching activities of any firm regulated 
only by a home supervisor, who is judged to have failed to meet the required standards of 
supervisory practice. Such fragmentation would represent a major step backwards for the Single 
Market.110  
 
B.  Phase II:  From the ESFS to the European Banking Union 
The nature of the regulatory architecture itself may not be an important cause of a financial 
crisis. Yet the ‘institutional design’ can be very important for the prevention and resolution of a 
major financial crisis. Prevention is dealt with through a framework of systemic risk control and 
robust prudential regulations. Crisis management and resolution, on the other hand, require 
established supervisory and resolution structures, which in an integrated market, must have a 
cross-border remit, in order to override or subsume the principle of home country control.111 For 
a very long time and until the different pillars of the European Banking Union come into place, 
the regulatory structures of the EU have been characterized by three principles: decentralization, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
By pre-committing to burden sharing, governments would give up some of their sovereignty, but in 
return, the single market in banking serving Europe’s businesses and consumers would be saved. 
Goodhart, C. A. E., & Schoenmaker, D. (2006). Burden Sharing in a Banking Crisis in Europe. Sveriges 
Riksbank Economic Review, 2, 34-57. This proposal was refined and suggested to become an integral part 
of group level recovery and resolution plans for cross-border banks in Avgouleas, E, Goodhart, C. & 
Schoenmaker, D. (2013). Bank Resolution Plans as a Catalyst for Global Financial Reform. Journal of 
Financial Stability, 9, in press.  
109 See, Larosiere, J. d. (February 2009). Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the 
EU. European Union, Brussels, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf.  
110 EU. (June 22, 2012). Country-specific recommendations on economic and fiscal policies: The 
European Semester, 2012. Luxembourg: Council of the European Union, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/131135.pdf.  
 
111 Garicano, L., & Lastra, R. M. (2010). Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven 
Principles. Journal of International Economic Law, 13(3), 597-621. See also, The new supervisory 
framework in the EU, see Arroyo, H. T. (2011). The EU’s Fiscal Crisis and Policy Response: reforming 
economic governance in the EU Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European 
Commission, available at http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgetingandpublicexpenditures/48871475.pdf  
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lack of coordination and segmentation. A careful look at the developmental phase of European 
institution-building reveals this has been a process of experimentation rather than design.112 The 
preceding analysis of the crisis and of the responses to it has shown that the inadequacies of the 
EU financial and institutional framework have played an important role in undermining the 
stability of the Eurozone financial sector during the crisis. 
The EU Treaties did not establish clear institutional borders as a prerequisite for the 
efficient functioning of ‘multilevel European governance’. This flaw was most evident in the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. European responses to this crisis highlighted the current role of 
and power balance among EU institutions and Member States where the Union continues only to 
react to, and very rarely foresees, urgent needs and international developments which call for a 
speedy reaction. ‘Who does what’ in Europe has been occupying policy-makers for many 
years.113 A ‘competence catalogue’ was included in the Lisbon Treaty, in force since 1 December 
2009. This distinguishes between EU and the member state powers/competences on the basis of 
the principle of conferral and recognition. Essentially, for the first time in EU’s history it has 
been explicitly enshrined in the Treaties that competences not conferred upon the Union remain 
with the Member States.114  
The EU, as a whole, has embarked on to a number of initiatives to build an integrated 
surveillance framework with respect to: (1) the implementation of fiscal policies under the 
Stability and Growth Pact to strengthen economic governance and to ensure budgetary 
discipline, and, (2) the implementation of structural reforms. As a first step, Eurozone Heads of 
State adopted the intergovernmental Euro Plus Pact, to strengthen the economic pillar of EMU 
and achieve a new quality of economic policy coordination, with the objective of improving 
competitiveness and thereby leading to a higher degree of convergence. As this remains outside 
the existing institutional framework a constitutional amendment to the EMU will be required to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Schoenmaker, D. (19 December 2009). The financial crisis: Financial trilemma in Europe VOX: 
Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists. 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/financial-crisis-and-europe-s-financial-trilemma  
113 COM. (2001). European Governance - A White Paper.  Brussels: Commission of the European 
Communities. 
114 Wouters, J., & Ramopoulos, T. (2012). 
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implement it.115 In addition, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a ‘six-pack’ set of 
new legislative acts, aimed at strengthening the Eurozone’s economic governance by reduction 
of deficits through tighter control of national finances.116 The reforms represented the most 
comprehensive reinforcement of economic governance in the EU and the euro area since the 
launch of the EMU almost 20 years ago. This legislative package aims at concrete and decisive 
steps towards ensuring fiscal discipline to stabilize the EU economy and to avert new crisis in 
future.  
Moreover, the EMU is currently in the process of adopting a number of radical 
institutional reforms with a view of addressing the existential challenges it is facing. Radical 
measures have been adopted, which aim at stabilizing market conditions and containing the 
impact of the Eurozone debt crisis on the banking system and vice versa, containing negative 
feedback loops between banks and sovereigns.117  Breaking up the vicious circle of bank debt 
piling up on sovereign debt is a matter of utmost importance for the survival of the Eurozone. EU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Conclusions of the European Council, 24–25 March 2011, EUCO 10/1/10 REV 1, and subsequently 
revised conclusions, EU. (January 25, 2012). Conclusions of the European Council, December 09, 2011 
(Vol. EUCO 139/1/11 REV 1). 
 
116 The legislative ‘six-pack’ set of European economic governance architecture reforms comprised five 
regulations and one directive, proposed by the European Commission to come into force on 13 December 
2011. See, Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 
16, 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, OJ 2011, L 306/1; 
Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 16, 2011 on 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, OJ 2011, L 
306/8; Regulation (EU) No 1175/ 2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 16, 
2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 2011 L 306/12; 
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 16, 2011 on 
the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJ 2011 L 306/25; Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1177/2011 of November 08, 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ 2011 L 306/25; Council Directive 
2011/85/EU of November 08, 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, OJ 
2011 L 306/41. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/index_en.htm  
See also Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 04, 
2011 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 2011 L 306/12, at 15–16. 
117 See also, Ferran, E. (2010). Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market 
Supervision. In G.Ferrarini, K.J.Hopt & E.Wymeersch (Eds.), Rethinking Financial Regulation and 
Supervision in Times of Crisis (OUP, 2012). 
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members need to complete the adjustment of internal and external imbalances, to repair financial 
sectors and to achieve sustainable public finances.118 The economic and financial crisis has 
exacerbated pressure on the public finances of EU Member States where 23 out of the 27 
Member States fall in the so-called ‘excessive deficit procedure’ (EDP). EDP is a mechanism 
established by the EU Treaties obliging countries to keep their budget deficits below 3% of GDP 
and government debts below 60 percent of GDP. Accordingly, the Member States running any 
excess deficit must comply with the recommendations and deadlines as decided by the EU 
Council to correct their excessive deficit.119 Piling up debt in their effort to bail out Europe’s 
ailing banks only makes things worse. In addition, it raises the cost of borrowing for Eurozone 
members to unsustainable levels, necessitating continuous bailouts by the wealthier members of 
the Eurozone in an effort to keep the EMU from breaking up. However, such sovereign bailouts 
are not only very expensive they are also highly unpopular with the citizens of lender countries. 
The most important of forthcoming reforms is the decision to move towards a banking 
union reflected by the legislative proposal for a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) for the 
euro area, the entry into force of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and the ECB 
decision to undertake Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) in secondary markets for the 
bonds of Eurozone countries. Conditional on measures implemented at the national level, these 
policy initiatives will also support fiscal consolidation and private sector deleveraging.120 The 
Liikanen report121 has proposed solutions to separate deposit-taking banking from riskier 
banking activities. However, a comprehensive EU mandate on structural reform of the EU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 EU. (Spring 2012). European Economic Forecast (Vol. European Economy:  1|2012). European 
Commission:  Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, available at 
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119 There is however, mounting criticism of the conditionality of deficit reduction by pursuing austerity 
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banking sector may take some time as the EU faces so many existential problems on numerous 
fronts. 
Finally, irrespective of the progress already achieved on the policy side, the experience of 
the past two years reflects that reversal of sentiment in financial markets and widening of interest 
rate spreads can happen very rapidly if the implementation of radical measures falters or the 
measures do not seem radical enough to meet the requisite challenges. The next few paragraphs 
will provide an analytical account of the reforms that are developed to strengthen the EU’s 
financial and monetary stability with particular focus on the forthcoming Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and the mooted pan-European resolution and deposit insurance arrangements. 
 
IV.  The European Banking Union 
Responding to the ever growing pressure for more bank and sovereign bailouts the European 
Commission initiated the establishment of institutions that would support the ESM122 and lead to 
the establishment of a more integrated banking union in the EMU.123 This has, in principle, three 
pillars: a unified supervision mechanism (the SSM), operated by the European Central Bank, a 
future pan-European deposit guarantee scheme (DGS), and a future single bank resolution 
mechanism with common backstops.  
It should be noted here that new structures adopted by the leadership of the Eurozone to 
put off the burning flames of the continuous banking and sovereign debt crisis are not without 
their detractors. Authoritative voices argue that European-level crisis management action 
(including bank recapitalizations by the ESM) which is so far contingent on the establishment of 
a permanent institutional infrastructure (i.e., an effective SSM) has been perceived as ‘a delaying 
tactic’ and in denial of the urgency of the present situation.124 Another sensitive question pertains 
to whether the doors of a new integrated financial supervisory mechanism are to be closed on 
non-EU countries. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 See, Article 81 of the Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010; Regulation No 1094/2010; and Regulation (EU) 
No 1095/2010 
123 See, speech of the President of the EU Commission Manuel Barroso, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/president/news/archives/2012/06/20120626_speeches_2_en.htm  
124 Véron, N. (October 17, 2012 ). The First Step in Europe’s Banking Union: Difficult but Achievable. 
RealTime Economic Issues Watch; the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Available at 
http://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime/?p=3174. 
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A.  The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
As mentioned earlier, the EU’s reliance on national supervisory structures for the single market 
proved to be flawed. The failure of the rudimentary crisis management coordination mechanisms 
that were in place, through the Lamfalussy level 3 committees, lacked both the competence and 
the resources to cope with a cross-border banking crisis that endangered taxpayers’ money. Lack 
of appropriate co-ordination structures was nowhere more evident than bank recovery and 
resolution. Similarly the complete absence of a centralized EU structure dealing with systemic 
risk monitoring was incomprehensible. The most important of those gaps in the Eurozone 
institutional edifice is about to be remedied through the establishment of the first and most 
significant pillar of the proposed European Banking Union, the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM). 
On 12 September 2012 the Commission proposed a single supervisory mechanism for 
Eurozone banks, which will be run by the European Central Bank (ECB), in order to strengthen 
the Economic and Monetary Union. The SSM is the first step towards an integrated ‘banking 
union’ which includes further components such as a single rulebook, common deposit protection 
and single bank resolution mechanisms. The Commission called on the Council and the 
European Parliament to adopt proposed regulations by the end of 2012, together with the other 
three components of an integrated ‘banking union’ – the single rulebook in the form of capital 
requirements (IP/11/915), harmonized deposit protection schemes (IP/10/918), and a single 
European recovery and resolution framework (IP/12/570).  In the words of the president of the 
European Commission José-Manuel Barroso: 
 
This new system, with the European Central Bank at the core and involving national 
supervisors, will restore confidence in the supervision of all banks in the euro area…We 
should make it a top priority to get the European supervisor in place by the start of next 
year. This will also pave the way for any decisions to use European backstops to 
recapitalize banks.  
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Barroso has also explained with authority the main purpose of these arrangements: ‘We want to 
break the vicious link between sovereigns and their banks. In future, bankers' losses should no 
longer become people's debt, bringing into doubt the financial stability of whole countries.’  
The desirable ambit of the ECB’s supervisory powers has been the subject of 
considerable debate. Several member states have wanted the SSM to be restricted to 
‘systemically important’ banks. For example, there is a controversy on whether German savings 
and cooperative banks should come under the remit of the SSM, as these banks consider 
themselves as local regional banks with passive assets and low risk exposures hence, subject to 
different policy regime from commercial banks. However, small or medium-size banks can also 
endanger the stability of EU financial system as well, e.g., the failures of banks like Northern 
Rock or the Spanish Caixas. Thus, a single supervisory mechanism is probably a more effective 
option. Furthermore, the existence of two supervisory mechanisms for banks, operating in the 
same market, would inevitably create conflicts of jurisdiction and competence (‘turf wars’) 
undermining the banking union. Early indications say that the ECB will be empowered to take 
over the supervision of any bank in the Eurozone if it so decides, in particular if the bank is 
receiving public support. Namely, the ECB will set the rules and be able to assume directly all 
relevant supervisory tasks, whenever it considers it appropriate, for each one of these 6,000 
Eurozone banks. However, in principle, the ECB will focus its direct supervision only on those 
banks, which can generate significant prudential risks through their size or risk profile.  
Thus, within the unified supervisory system, the ECB have direct responsibility for 
around 150 banks with assets of more than 30 billion Euros, or those with assets representing 
more than 20 percent of a Member State’s GDP. National supervisors within the same unified 
supervisory system will primarily supervise the remaining banks. Finally, while the ECB will 
have the power to step in to assume direct supervision at any moment, if need be, national 
supervisors will remain in charge of tasks like consumer protection, money laundering and 
branches of third country banks. ECB supervision will be phased in automatically on 1 July 2013 
for the most significant European systemically important banks, and on 1 January 2014 for all 
other banks.  
The ECB will be vested with the necessary investigatory and supervisory powers to 
perform its task and will apply single rulebook across the single financial market to carry out 
following functions:   
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i. Licensing/authorizing credit institutions;  
ii. Monitoring compliance with capital, leverage and liquidity requirements;  
iii. Conducting supervision of financial conglomerates; and, 
iv. Early intervention measures (Prompt Corrective Action) when a bank breaches or risks 
breaching regulatory capital requirements by requiring banks to take remedial action.  
The reforms roadmap bequeaths ECB the status of a mother institution for the SSM. The June 
2012 statement125 identifies article 127(6) of the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty126 as the legal 
basis for the SSM, which means the new supervisor will be part of the ECB. Yet the roadmap 
does not hand over the management of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to the ECB 
until the new supervisory structures prove their effectiveness.  
The legislative proposals127 published by the Commission establishing the SSM have still 
to work out appropriate solutions for some outstanding issues. Firstly, as regards the 
geographical reach of the membership, that is, who to include and who to exclude from the EU 
members into the EBU. Beck has argued that the need for a banking union is stronger within a 
currency union because as it is here where the close link between monetary and financial 
stability plays out strongest and where the link between government and banking fragility is 
exacerbated as national governments lack policy tools that countries with an independent 
monetary policy have available.128 But some non-euro area member states, including in Central 
Europe and Scandinavia, may want to join, and they have a veto over decisions under article 
127(6). However, as far as the UK is concerned, it has been made categorically obvious that it 
would not join the SSM. Thus, while, the Commission maintains that the banking union and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Euro Area Summit Statement. (June 29, 2012). Brussels, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf.  
126 Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon, entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. (30 March 2010). Official Journal of the European Union: C 83/01, Volume 53. 
127 Issued on September 12, 2012, see EC. (September 12, 2012). Commission proposes new ECB powers 
for banking supervision as part of a banking union Press Release. Brussels/Strasbourg: European 
Commission. And also, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: A Roadmap towards a Banking Union. (September 12, 2012) (Vol. COM(2012) 510 final). 
European Commission, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/reform/20120912-com-2012-510.  
128 Beck, T. (2012). Banking Union as a Crisis Management Tool, in Banking Union for Europe Risks and 
Challenges, [electronic resource], Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Retrieved from 
http://www.dsf.nl/assets/cms/File/Events/Thorsten%20Beck_Banking_Union.pdf  
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single market are mutually reinforcing processes and that the establishment of banking union is 
inseparable from the completion of substantive regulatory reforms, which are already underway 
for the single market under the ‘single rulebook’, the geopolitical reality might be that the EMU 
and non-EMU members (Member States with a derogation) within the EU are pulling much 
further apart than ever before.129  
Secondly, there is a legitimate concern that adding supervision - a politically charged task 
- to the ECB’s responsibilities, may compromise its impartiality and independence. Therefore, 
the supervisory function needs to be kept discrete and independent from the rest of the ECB 
structures to preserve its institutional autonomy. This is a very important distinction since 
banking and monetary policy, though inter-linked, are not identical.	   However, there are 
contrasting views as regards the extent and form of separation between the two functions.130 
 
B.  The New EU Resolution Framework: Plans for Integrated Resolution Funds and 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
To provide for common mechanisms to resolve banks and guarantee customer deposits, the 
Commission has proposed instituting a single resolution mechanism, which would govern the 
resolution of banks and coordinate in particular the application of ‘resolution tools’ to banks 
within the EU. The resolution mechanism is aimed at safeguarding the continuity of essential 
banking operations, to protect depositors, client assets and public funds, and to minimize risks to 
financial stability. This mechanism would be more efficient than a network of national resolution 
authorities particularly in the case of cross-border failures, given the need for speed and 
credibility in addressing the issues in the midst of a crisis.131 The decisions have to be taken in 
line with the principles of resolution as set out in the single rulebook consistent with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Member States who have not adopted the euro are not members of the Governing Council of the ECB.   
130 E.g., there is overlap of representatives between the supervisory board and the Governing Council. 
Therefore, as Beck and Gros conclude that raising Chinese walls between the two highly overlapping 
bodies would make no sense. See, Beck, T., & Gros, D. (March 2013). Monetary Policy and Banking 
Supervision: Coordination instead of Separation. European Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2013-
003; published as CEPS Policy Brief. 
131 See also, Beck, T. (2012). Banking Union for Europe Risks and Challenges, [electronic resource], 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Retrieved from 
http://www.dsf.nl/assets/cms/File/Events/Thorsten%20Beck_Banking_Union.pdf and Schinasi, G. 
(November 05, 2012) also distinguishes between immediate crisis resolution and intermediate to long-
term measures. 
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international best practices and in full compliance with Union state aid rules, in particular that, 
shareholders and creditors should bear the cost of resolution before any external funding is 
granted.132 
The main resolution tools, as detailed in the Commission’s proposal directive for crisis 
management and resolution, are the following:  
(1) the sale of business tool whereby the authorities would sell all or part of the failing 
bank to another bank, without the consent of shareholders);  
(2) the bridge bank tool, which consists of identifying the good assets or essential 
functions of the bank and separates them into a new bank (bridge bank). The bridge bank 
will later be sold to another entity, in order to preserve these essential banking functions 
or facilitate the continuous access to deposits. The old bank with the bad or non-essential 
functions would then be liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings;  
(3) the asset separation tool, whereby the bad assets of the bank are put into an asset 
management vehicle. This tool relieves the balance sheet of a bank from bad or ‘toxic’ 
assets. In order to prevent this tool from being used solely as a state aid measure, the 
framework prescribes that it may be used only in conjunction with another tool (bridge 
bank, sale of business or write-down). This ensures that while the bank receives support, 
it also undergoes restructuring; and, 
(4) the bail-in tool, whereby the bank would be recapitalized with shareholders wiped out 
or diluted, and creditors would have their claims reduced or converted to shares.  
Therefore, an institution for which a private buyer cannot be found, or which cannot split up 
without destroying franchise value and other intra-firm synergies, could thus continue to provide 
essential services without the need for bail-out by public funds, and authorities would have time 
to reorganize it or wind down parts of its business in an orderly manner. To this end, banks 
would be required to have a minimum percentage of their total liabilities in the shape of 
instruments eligible for bail-in. If triggered, they would be written down in a pre-defined order in 
terms of seniority of claims in order for the institution to regain viability. The choice of tools will 
depend on the specific circumstances of each case and build on options laid out in the resolution 
plan prepared for the bank. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 EC. (Sep 09, 2012). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: A Roadmap towards a Banking Union (Vol. COM (2012) 510 final). Brussels. 
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A bank would become subject to resolution when: (a) it has reached a point of distress 
such that there are no realistic prospects of recovery over an appropriate timeframe, (b) all other 
intervention measures above have been exhausted, and (c) winding up the institution under 
normal insolvency proceedings would risk prolonged uncertainty or financial instability. Thus, 
entry into resolution will always occur at a point close to insolvency.  
The Commission has also proposed the harmonization and simplification of protected 
deposit regimes, faster pay-outs and improved financing of schemes, notably through ex-ante 
funding of deposit guarantee schemes and a mandatory mutual borrowing facility between the 
national schemes. Therefore, if a national deposit guarantee scheme finds itself depleted, it can 
borrow from another national fund. The mutual borrowing facility would be the first step 
towards a pan-EU deposit guarantee scheme, and would be a natural complement to the 
establishment of a single supervisory mechanism. The single rulebook could include rules on the 
structure of the banking sector.  
The EBA should develop a single supervisory handbook to complement the single 
rulebook. In order to avoid any divergence between the Euro Area and the rest of the EU, the 
single rulebook should be underpinned by uniform supervisory practices. Different supervisory 
handbooks and supervisory approaches between the Member States participating in the single 
supervisory mechanism and the other Member States pose a risk of fragmentation of the single 
market, as banks could exploit the differences to pursue regulatory arbitrage.  
 
C.  Evaluation of EU Regulatory Reforms  
Weaknesses in the institutional framework have affected EU financial integration in two ways: 
firstly, the incomplete or partial harmonization of the pre-crisis supervisory and regulatory 
framework prevented the benefits of full integration from being reaped and created fragilities in 
the financial sector to build up in a way that became threatening over time and, secondly, the 
crisis revealed the vulnerabilities and gaps in the national and EU-wide crisis management 
frameworks. These weaknesses have resulted in partial disintegration of the internal market and 
have caused splits along national lines of some segments of the single EU market for capital and 
financial services.133 Thus, for the EU, progression to a framework of tighter financial integration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 ECB. (April 2012). Financial Integration in Europe: European Central Bank. P.87 
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and risk controls for the banking system – together with improved governance standards in the 
monetary and fiscal spheres and centralization of responsibility for financial stability – has 
become a one-way road. 
Current EU reforms promise to create a stronger financial and institutional framework in 
order to strengthen the resilience of the single market and mitigate the risk of vicious circles of 
market instability and fragmentation observed during the GFC and the on-going Eurozone debt 
crisis.134 Nonetheless, current integration efforts are high risk, as their core only extends to the 
seventeen EMU members and, thus, it might create irreparable fractures for the internal market 
that remains incomplete at this stage.135 Moreover, the new arrangements under the SSM need to 
become ‘first-best’136 framework in order to stabilize the euro-area sovereign debt crisis and 
financial instability. Effective supervision, however, will challenge the fiscal sovereignty of 
Eurozone members,137 especially, as the SSM will be able to activate the permanent EU rescue 
fund in order to directly recapitalize struggling Eurozone banks, such as those in Spain. This 
initiative, which essentially centralizes control over Eurozone finances by reducing the power of 
national governments, has attracted criticism from different quarters with respect to the role of 
the ECB, which will end up mustering an enormous amount of power without having a 
democratic mandate. At the same time, the legal basis for the new arrangements must be robust 
and must include a mechanism for judicial review, and gives rise to criticism as to whether this is 
best feasible under Article 127(6) of TFEU or other Treaty provisions.  
Finally, the establishment of the SSM is only a big first step on a much longer path 
towards building crisis management and resolution institutions for the EU banking union. There 
remain several essential components such as a European banking charter, a fully-fledged single 
rulebook, a single resolution authority and a common deposit insurance scheme whose detailed 
arrangements are still to be worked out. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 ECB. (April 2012). Financial Integration in Europe: European Central Bank. P.12 
135 Lastra, R. (2013).  Banking Union and Single Market: Conflict or Companionship?, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 36, forthcoming. 
 
136 Schinasi elaborates on ‘first-best’ mechanism in the EU context comprising of single supervisor, 
uniform deposit insurance, and European resolution mechanism. 
137 Schinasi, G. (November 05, 2012). European Banking Union: Pros and Cons - A View from Across 
the Atlantic. Power point presentation, Available at 
http://www.dsf.nl/assets/cms/File/Events/Garry%20Schinasi_European%20Banking%20Union%20.pdf.  
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V. Conclusion: Fragmentation or a More Complete Union? 
The reform of the EU integration mechanisms in the aftermath of the GFC and in the context of 
Eurozone debt crisis marks an important milestone in the integration process and regionalism 
drive, especially because it has exposed the failure of various institutional mechanisms supposed 
to ensure financial market stability. The EU crisis response bears significant implications in the 
development and functioning of single market operations and has emphasized the need to 
improve international and regional coordination on fiscal, monetary and financial policies 
affecting other states. 
Over a period of several decades, the progressive development of an integrated single 
financial market in the EU combined with a single currency among 17 of its members led to the 
imbalances that became visible when the GFC erupted in 2008.138 Unfortunately, despite the vast 
amount of effort expended in developing both the EU single financial market and EMU, 
important design features necessary to support financial stability had not been put in place or 
were not sufficiently robust, particularly in relation to burden sharing, resolution of cross-border 
financial institutions, deposit guarantee arrangements, regulation and supervision, and fiscal 
arrangements and affairs.  
It is not controversial, even though it does challenge orthodox thinking, to argue that 
financial integration is not always beneficial. Despite the increased importance of enhanced 
regionalism and integration, policy formulation must take a balanced view. The European crisis 
provides a deep insight to the risks of integration and identifies mistakes not to be repeated in 
following integration plans elsewhere.  
This balanced view of integration offers further perspectives: Firstly, that the soundness 
and credibility of domestic policies are not substitutes for regional commitments even though, at 
times when domestic policies are ‘stuck’, regional commitments can help to ‘tie hands’ and exert 
external pressure. Secondly, rather than imposition of strict benchmarks and milestones to meet 
the idiosyncrasies of individual economies, the integration framework should facilitate and 
encourage the growth of regional economies while allowing the market to work freely. Thirdly, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Stark, J. (2012). Crisis and Recovery in Emerging Europe: The Policy Response in Retrospect and 
Challenges Ahead. In T. Bracke & R. Martin (Eds.), From Crisis to Recovery: Old and New Challenges 
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doesn’t matter how much integration or liberalization has been achieved in the region, but what 
matters is that regional approaches and small steps of cooperation result in increased integration 
which can bring more growth, development and stability while lowering associated contagion-
driven risks. 
Risks flowing from cross-border financial crises tend to intensify within integrated 
markets. The more integrated is a regional market the higher the propensity for cross-border 
contagion. The cascading effects of the on-going Eurozone crisis are a vivid reminder of the 
contagion risk in a highly integrated system.139 The EU crisis is a powerful reassertion of the 
same reality that reflects on the vulnerability of economically integrated markets in times of 
crisis when national responses prove insufficient to deal with the common issues in an 
economically integrated area.  
Given this context, the European example constitutes a major significant precedent and as 
a laboratory of economic, legal, and political integration transcending national borders. 
The Eurozone debt crisis has clearly exposed the weaknesses of regulatory structures 
divided along national lines when these have to deal with integrated cross-border financial 
markets. It has also highlighted the limited range of policy choices available from within the EU 
/ EMU system as it existed prior to 2008. As a result, the EU faces a number of hard choices 
extending to the intractable trade off between national sovereignty and collective financial 
stability. The plans to establish a European banking union within the boundaries of the Eurozone, 
which will include a single supervisor and, in the future, a single resolution authority and a pan-
European deposit guarantee scheme, have clearly tilted the balance towards further centralization 
and pooling of sovereignty.  
From the EU regulatory reforms discussed above, three initiatives stand out. First, plans 
to centralize supervision for Eurozone banks through the SSM, which will come into force in 
2014. This will mean that the ECB140 is poised to take over as the prudential supervisor of the 
Eurozone banking sector. Second, EU plans for the harmonization of member state resolution 
laws and introduction of integrated resolution structures are in the process of implementation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 ADB. (July 2012). Asian Economic Integration Monitor: Asian Development Bank. 
http://www.aric.adb.org/pdf/aeim/AEIM_2012July_FullReport.pdf.  
140 It should also be noted that the ECB had never had a ‘treaty-based’ mandate to act as shock-absorber 
in the Euro area sovereign debt markets. Absence of this mandate will continue to represent a missing link 
in the EU reform process. 
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Third, the development of common EU rulebooks for the single market by the European 
Supervisory Authorities is proceeding rapidly. Another area of particular importance is the 
adoption by the EU, through the ESM (and the European Banking Union), of measures, which 
aim at breaking the link between levels of sovereign indebtedness and bank bail outs. A very 
important lesson is how the EU has recently apportioned the costs of the Cyprus rescue to private 
stakeholders, such as shareholders, bondholders and large depositors, treating essentially the 
latter as investors.141 
EU Member States have set up, in the course of the last 60 years, institutions in order to 
manage the challenges of a multi-faceted integration process and provide acceptable structures 
for political and democratic accountability. EU institutions have also been used by the Union in 
order to accumulate knowledge and expertise that may be useful in responding to new 
challenges. But we should be careful in arguing that the EU institution-building experience, or 
for that matter the EU integration process, given the specific characteristic of internal market,142 
can be used as the only reform template, although they can indeed provide model lessons to the 
rest of the world.143  
The impact of institutions dealing with financial markets has mostly been ignored, 
probably because economists regarded such impact as ‘unimportant’144 in a free market 
environment. So while the EU is obliged to take drastic steps to cover gigantic gaps in its policy 
and regulatory framework to prevent irrevocable fractures in financial integration, it still needs to 
proceed with caution, as all this is untested territory. This caveat puts the usefulness of lessons 
drawn on EU institution-building experience in the right context.145 Moreover, it should be noted 
that the ECB had never had a ‘treaty-based’ mandate to act as shock-absorber in the Euro area 
sovereign debt markets. Absence of this mandate will continue to represent a missing link in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 For a complete analysis of the Cyprus bailout plan and of its implications see Financial Times, In 
depth, ‘Cyprus bailout’, available at http://www.ft.com/in-depth/cyprus-bailout 
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  For	  example,	  the	  EU	  has	  a	  rather	  well	  developed	  banking	  sector	  that	  eventually	  became	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  fiscal	  
position	  of	   certain	  member	   states.	  The size of Eurozone’s banking system as a share of overall economy 
stood at over 300 percent in the pre-crisis period, whereas by a comparison, the banking system forms 
only 100 percent of the overall economy for the US. This implies that the largest euro area banks are a 
much larger part of any individual national economy within the EU zone.	  
143 Wouters, J., & Ramopoulos, T. (2012). 
144 Allen, F. (2001). Do Financial Institutions Matter? Journal of Finance, 56, 1165-1175. 
145 Allen, F., & Carletti, E. (2011). New Theories to Underpin Financial Reform. Journal of Financial 
Stability. doi: 10.1016/j.jfs.2011.07.001  
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EU reform process. Finally, the European Banking Union may not be seen as an entirely 
irreversible development. Taxpayers and governments from both the core and the periphery of 
the Eurozone may, in the end, decide that the wider and abstract good of further European 
integration and of the stability of the single market is not worth the loss of sovereignty, and 
perennial austerity and sacrifice of national interest that they seem to entail. Accordingly, East 
Asian economies, must find which parts of the European project are successful and suitable to 
them to adopt and which parts are either of dubious success or would lead to an intolerable loss 
of sovereignty in a region that is not accustomed to any considerable degree of political 
integration. 
Where, however, the EU experience is invaluable is in supplying policy-makers with 
irrefutable evidence about the axiom that, although financial markets may be established 
anywhere, provided that certain property rights are recognized by local law, in the absence of 
restrictions on cross-border flows, their stability may only be guaranteed through appropriate 
institutions and not by reliance on market forces’ rationality and co-ordination. Therefore, 
arrangements to safeguard the stability of the cross-border market cannot be delayed until formal 
integration efforts reach a peak, whether in the form of establishment of a single currency area, 
or otherwise.  
The complexities involved in harmonizing common practices, standards, and specifically 
the legal rules for such diverse economies mean that European Banking Union type institutions 
are not feasible in the foreseeable future. Yet this does not mean that the leadership of those 
countries should not think about the challenges to financial stability created by increasing market 
integration and financial interconnectedness in the region. It only means that for the time being, 
other less strongly integrative measures, such as subsidiarisation, are probably more suitable and 
effective in the East Asian context than the EU’s plans for centralization of cross-border bank 
supervision and resolution. In addition, while establishment of a single regulator with power to 
intervene and discipline banks is probably not feasible at present, building a macro-supervisory 
umbrella is essential. In such a case, the function of macro-prudential oversight ought to be 
discharged by an independent body in order to secure credibility and authority, even if it is a soft 
law body.  
Arguably, in an increasingly globalised world, formal international cooperation in the 
field of financial stability and cross-border bank supervision and resolution, might in the long 
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run come to be seen as a necessary ingredient of national prosperity in an environment where 
national financial markets are closely integrated.146 This would become especially the case if on-
going national and regional reforms prove to be less successful than expected.147 Building 
multilevel financial governance in a region as economically and politically integrated as the EU 
is infinitely less complicated than a similar attempt at the global scale. The same might apply to 
replication of EU plans in another region. Of course, in the end prove, institution building may 
prove more a challenge to be overcome rather than an insurmountable stumbling bloc. Either 
way policy-makers should not assume that they have ample time to deliberate before another 
major crisis breaks out. They should urgently start with the business of augmenting the global 
and regional financial stability mechanisms in order to safeguard future economic prosperity and 
the lessons drawn on the Eurozone crisis may prove very useful in this process. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 For an example of such a model for the governance of global financial markets see Avgouleas, E 
(2012). 
147	  E.g., James Barth contends that not everyone is convinced of the new regulations in place (in case of 
the US, the Dodd-Frank Act) has solved the too-big-to-fail problem, yet, the biggest banks have not been 
downsized despite the presence of a general consensus from various stake-holders. He quotes from Sheila 
Bair (Former FDIC Chair, Fortune, February 06, 2012), Richard Fischer & Harvey Rosenblum (FRB of 
Dallas, Wall Street Journal, April 4, 2012), and, Simon Johnson (Professor at MIT, Bloomberg, October 
10, 2011). See, Barth, J. R., & Prabha, A. P. (December 03, 2012). Breaking (Banks) Up is Hard to Do: 
New Perspectives on Too Big to fail. Financial Institutions Centre.  Retrieved from 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/12/12-16.pdf  
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